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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
trolling stock interest in a corporation was transferred to three named children of the
trustors as trustees. The trust instrument provided that the trustees were to hold
the stock in one fund until the stock was sold in one block or the company was liqui-
dated or merged, the income to be paid to the three named children or in the event of
the decease of one of the children, to his or her named child or children. Upon liquida-
tion the corpus was to be divided between thethree named children and four named
grandchildren. No time for duration of the trust was explicitly set by the trustors,
nor did the instrument contain an express direction to sell. On appeal it was held that
there was no violation of the rule against perpetuities. When the objects of a trust
have been fully accomplished, no specific duration of the trust having been set, the
trust then terminates and the corpus vests. The objects of this trust will have been
accomplished upon the death of the last of the seven beneficiaries. This will be within
the period of the rule against perpetuities; hence the trust is not invalid. The court
cited Hamley, The Rule against Perpetuities and Powers of Sale, 7 Wash. L. Rev.
237 (1932).
WILLS AND ESTATES
Construction of Wills-Conditions Precedent-Impossibility of
Performance. In In re Bridge's Estate,1 the testator executed a will
in 1945 with the following provision:
"... I hereby will and bequeath unto the following named persons the
amounts set opposite their respective names, provided, however, that if
any of said named persons are now employed by me or the Mary Bridge
Hospital and are not so employed at the time of my decease, then such
named former employees are hereby willed and bequeathed nothing."
In 1946 the testator was forced to retire and liquidate his medical
business because of ill health. The bequests to eight of the legatees
were contested. Six of the recipients were employed by the testator at
his clinic. One was employed at the hospital. They were personal
friends and had been with him for many years. Another recipient
had been engaged as his personal nurse prior to his retirement. All were
employed by him or the hospital at the time of the execution of the
will. All were in his employ at the time of his retirement except for
the hospital employee. She had suffered from a heart attack, and at the
direction of the testator she was placed in his hospital and given a pen-
sion. The personal nurse voluntarily left his employment after he re-
tired but before his death in 1949. The employment relations of the
others were severed because of the liquidation of the business, but they
continued to render occasional services in their professional capacity.
The court held that literal compliance with the condition of employ-
141 Wn2d 916, 253 P.2d 394 (1953).
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ment was to be dispensed with. The gifts to the employees in question
with the exception of the personal nurse were to become absolute.
The fundamental rule in the construction of wills is that the intention
of the testator is the controlling factor.' It becomes the duty of the
court to ascertain if possible, from the terms of the will itself, the true
intent of the testator.' But where there is an ambiguity in the terms,
extrinsic evidence is admissible to ascertain the intent.' It is also a rule
that while the will speaks as of the date of death, the intention of the
testator is to be determined as of the time of the execution will.'
The contention was made that parol testimony cannot be admitted
to show that the testator meant one thing when he said another. The
court replied that such a rule was a sound one but had no application
to the situation presented. "The question with which we are concerned
is whether the enforced dosing of the testator's business, which ren-
dered impossible a fulfillment of the condition precedent by the em-
ployees, was such an event as was intended by him to have the effect of
cutting off their bequests. "No attempt is made to prove by extrinsic
evidence that the testator intended something other than what he said;
on the contrary, the justification for considering such evidence is that
a state of facts has arisen which the testator did not anticipate and
for which he consequently failed to provide."'
The court conceded that impossibility will not excuse the perform-
ance of a condition in every instance. It declared that each case is to
be examined in the light of its own particular facts in order to determine
whether the concept of impossibility of performance is to be given
controlling effect. It went on to apply the following rule:
If personal property is bequeathed upon condition which, before time of
performance, becomes impossible to be performed, the property vests in the
legatee upon the death of the testator, unless it appears that the perform-
ance of the condition was the controlling motive for the making of the
bequest.7
2 1n re Lidston's Estate, 32 Wn.2d 408, 202 P.2d 259 (1949) ; In re Wilson's Estate,
111 Wash. 490, 191 Pac. 615 (1920).
3 RCW 11.12.230; In re McNulta's Estate, 168 Wash. 397, 12 P.2d 389 (1932);
Webster v. Thorndyke, 11 Wash. 390, 39 Pac. 677 (1895).
4 Harrel v. Rutherford, 40 Wn.2d 171, 241 P.2d 1171 (1952); In re Toronodo's
Estate, 38 Wn.2d 642, 228 P.2d 142 (1951) ; Shufeldt v. Shufeldt, 130 Wash. 253, 227
Pac. 6 (1924).
5 Tacoma Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. Nadham, 14 Wn.2d 576, 128 P.2d 982 (1942);
In re Phillip's Estate, 193 Wash. 194, 74 P.2d 1015 (1938) ; Peiffer v. Old National
Bank & Union Tr. Co. 166 Wash 1, 6 P.2d 386 (1931).
6 Note 1 supra, at 925, 253 P.2d at 399.
7Morley v. Calhoun, 7 Ohio O.C. (New Series) 285, (1898). See also Sherman
v. American Congregational Ass'n. 98 Fed. 495 (1899). Compare 4 REST., PRoPERY
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According to the court, the close relationship between the testator
and the legatees tended to show that the principal motive of the
testator was to benefit his old friends and associates. The bequests
were not rewards for staying in his employ until his death. There was
no evidence -that most of the beneficiaries even knew that they were
mentioned in the will.8 The failure of the testator to change his will
even after the employees had been discharged was viewed as suggesting
that he believed that the legatees would still be entitled to inherit
under it.'
The rule applied by the court has been criticized on the ground that
it is illogical and because it has no sound historical basis." Although
it has been quoted with approval by a number of courts, it has been
applied in only a limited number of cases." The rule serves to carry
out the probable intent of the testator, and is justifiable as a narrow
rule of construction.
Persons Entitled To Letters of Administration. In re Leith's
Estate,"2 upheld the discretionary power of the probate court to ap-
point as an administrator a nominee of a member of a preferred class
without waiting for the statutory forty day period to elapse though a
member of the preferred class petitions for his own appointment within
this period.
The intestate left surviving her a number of nieces and nephews.
One of the nieces petitioned the court for the appointment of her
daughter as general administratrix. Notice of the hearing which was
set for June 30, 1953, twenty-five days after the death of the decedent,
was given. Prior to the hearing another niece petitioned for her own
appointment as administratrix. A hearing was had on both petitions,
§ 438 (1944), where it is stated that: "Impossibility of performance of the terms
of a condition precedent, special limitation, condition subsequent or executionary
limitation, otherwise valid under the rules stated in §§ 434-437 excuses from such
performance if, and only if, this result is the judicially ascertained intent of the person
imposing the restraint."
8 See Comment e of 4 REST., PROPERTY § 438.
9 See Comment g of 4 REST., PROPERTY § 438 where it is stated that: "Prior to the
effective date of the conveyance, the conveyor may have actual knowledge that per-
formance of the terms of the restraint is impossible. When such knowledge is acquired
after the execution of the instrument of conveyance but before its effective date,
as in the case of knowledge acquired by a testator subsequent to the execution of the
will and before his death, failure to revoke the instrument normally tends to an infer-
ence that the gift was to take effect despite the inevitable failure of its terms."
l0 See Pound, Legacies on Impossible or Illegal Conditions Precedent, 3 ILL. L. REV.
1 (1908).
11 See Simes, The Effect of Impossibility Upon Conditions in Wills, 34 MIcH. L.
REv. 909 (1936).
12 42 Wn.2d 223, 254 P.2d 490 (1953).
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and the court made an oral ruling appointing the daughter of- the first
niece who had petitioned. All the nieces and nephews with the exception
of first petitioner joined in petitioning the court for the appointment of
one of their number and asked the court to reconsider the oral ruling.
From a denial of this motion and the order appointing the daughter, an
appeal was brought. The supreme court upheld the order of the lower
court on the authority of In re St. Martin's Estate,"8 and State ex rel.
Karney v. Superior Court."
RCW 11.28.120 provides that:
Administration of the estate of the person dying intestate shall be granted
to some one or more of the persons hereinafter mentioned, and they shall
be respectively entitled in the following order:
(2) The next of kin- in the following order:. . (e) nephews or nieces.
(4) If the persons so entitled fail for moee than forty days after the death
of the intestate to present a petition for letters of administration, or if it
appears to the satisfaction of the court that there are no relatives or next
of kin, as above specified eligible to appointment, or they waive their right,
and there are no principal cerditor or creditors, or such creditor or creditors
waive their right, then the court may appoint any suitable person to ad-
minister the estate.
The failure of a member of a preferred class to petition the court
for letters of administration within the specified time constitutes a
waiver of his right to be appointed, and confers upon the court the
jurisdiction to appoint "any suitable and competent person."18 Whether
the court acquires jurisdiction upon an application made before the
forty day period has not been expressly decided before, although some
cases have indicated that it does.1
In State ex rel. Karney v. Superior Court, supra, the appointment of
the nominee of two non-resident daughters was attacked by the son,
who apparently filed his petition for appointment after the forty day
period. It was contended that the forty day period had not expired
when the appointment was made. The court declared that it "was
under no obligation to wait forty days for others in the same class to
18175 Wash. 285, 27 P.2d 326 (1933).
14 143 Wash. 358, 255 Pac. 376 (1927).
15 The phrase "next of 1cmn does not include "persons, although relatives by blood,
who have no interest in the estate, either under the statutes of descent or by the terms
of the will of a decedent." In re Covington's Estate, 177 Wash. 668, 670, 33 P.2d 87,
88 (1934), State ex rel. Cowley v. Superior Court, 158 Wash. 546, 291 Pac. 376(1927).i8 McLean v. Roller, 33 Wash. 166, 73 Pac. 1123 (1903), In re Mason's Estate, 189
Wash. 641, 66 P2d 310 (1937).
17 Inre Wilbur's Estate, 8 Wash. 35, 34 Pac. 407 (1894), In re Miller's Estate,
130 Wash. 199, 226 Pac. 493 (1924) ; See State ex rel. Karney v. Superior Court, note
14 supra at p. 362, 255 Pac. 377.
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appear and make application, ''l 7a and that "others of the preferred class
who desired to present their rights to the court should have appeared
and presented those rights in that proceeding."lb However, the holding
would seem to be limited to the proposition that a member of the pre-
ferred class who does not petition within the forty day period cannot
thereafter contest the appointment even though it is made within that
period.
In the instant case, the members of the preferred class petitioned
the court before the lapse of the forty day period but were denied a
hearing because such action would "render uncertain and delay the
appointment of any administrator. . . [T]his consequence would be
inconsistent with the purpose and result of the statutory notice of
hearing." The court went on 'to say that the probate court was not
required to reconsider its oral decision and that there was "no clear
showing that this ruling was an abuse of discretion."
Similar statutes have been generally construed to confer upon the
person first entitled to letters of administration an absolute right of
which the court has no power to deprive him otherwise than as provided
in the statutes." But the Washington court has consistently held that
under the statute, the preference right conferred is not absolute,!9 and
that a suitable person other than the petitioner may be appointed when
there is a substantial reason requiring it."0 The reasoning of the court
has been that the statute" which disqualifies certain persons from
acting as executors or administrators does not specify that there shall
be no other grounds than those enumerated;2 and that there is a
predominant right in those interested in having an estate administered
and distributed in accordance with the law. If the statute were manda-
tory this predominant right would be defeated by the appointment of
an unsuitable person of the preferred class."'
The statute does not, by its express terms, confer a right of nomin-
ation to any of the enumerated classes, except the surviving husband
17a Note 14 supra, at p. 362. 255 Pac. at p. 377.
17b Ibid.
s 2 BANC. PROB. PRAC. 2d § 241 (1950).
10 In re Covington's Estate, note 15 supra; State ex rel. Cowley v. Superior Court,
note 15 supra; In re Langill's Estate, 117 Wash. 268, 201 Pac. 28 (1921).
20 In re L.-ngill's Estate, note 19 supra (stranger preferred to a son who had misused
funds of estate and whose general charart.-r was such as to render him unfit) ; In re
St. Martin's Estate, note 13 supra, and In re Tho-as' Estate, 167 Wash. 127, 8 P.2d
963 (1932) (court on its own motion appointed st. anger when it appeared that there
was dissension among the heirs).
21 RCW 11.36.010.
22 In re Langill's Estate, note 19 supra.
28 In re Stott's Estate, 133 Wash. 100, 233 Pac. 280 (1925).
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or wife.' Although there is dictum in one case to the effect that the
person qualified must either accept the appointment himself or waive
the right absolutely, 5 it has been held that a request by the petitioner
that another person be appointed in his place constitutes a qualified
waiver which does not forfeit the rights of the petitioner at least where
a creditor has also petitioned.2" Such a request is entitled to serious
consideration, however, and the court should exercise its discretion
in favor of such nominee sr but it is not controlling upon the court's
ultimate decision."
In the instant case, there were two or more persons in equal right,
one of whom applied in his own name for appointment and the other
requested the appointment of a nominee. The Washington court, in
In re St. Martin's Estate," and in In re Thomas' Estate,0 upheld the
appointment of a person other than the petitioner or the nominee upon
motion of the probate court itself when it appeared that there was
dissension among the heirs. Although in the instant case the second
niece, who petitioned in her own right, did not introduce evidence at
the hearing, there was no finding by the probate court that this appli-
cant was unsuitable or that there appeared to be any dissension among
the heirs.
Although the decision may be in accord with the general reluctance
of the supreme court to disturb lower court rulings and with the policy
of facilitating the administration of estates, it would seem to be so at
the expense of the rights of those interested in securing a competent
administrator.
Proof of Lost or Destroyed Will. RCW 11.20.070 provides that
24 Part one refers to "the surviving husband or wife, or such person as he or she
may request to have appointed." The surviving spouse, if competent, is entitled to
letters of administration in preference to others but whether this right is absolute has
not been decided by court. See In re Bredi's Estate, 117 Wash. 372, 374, 201 Pac. 296
(1921), which would seem to indicate that it is not. The provision conferring a right
to nominate a competent person is probably an absolute one. See McLean v. Roller,
note 16 supra, at 171, 73 Pac. at 1123.
25 State ex reL. Cowley v. Superior Court, note 15 supra, at 550.26 Larson v. Stewart, 69 Wash. 223, 124 Pac. 382 (1912). In In re Erickson's Estate,
145 Wash. 99, 258 Pac. 857 (1927) it was held that the creditor does not have an
absolute right to be appointed. Although a creditor is given a preference right by the
statute, his right depends upon the total nonaction of the preceding classes, and the
court may appoint a nominee of the member of the preceding class to the exclusion of
the creditor, Larson v. Stewart, supra, unless such rioninee is not a suitable person
as in I re Utter's Estate, 112 Wash. 197, Pac. 836 (1920).2 7 Larson v. Stewart, note 26 supra.
28 In re Mason's Estate, note 16 supra; In re Utter's Estate, note 15 supra; In re St
Martin's Estate, note 13 supra.29 Note 13 supra.
30 Note 20 sura.
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"No will shall be allowed to be proved as a lost or destroyed will...
unless its provisions shall be clearly and distinctly proved by at least
two witnesses. . . ." In In re Peters' Estate," a secretary had made a
carbon copy of a will but had not witnessed its execution. The court
held that she was competent to testify to the provisions of the will.
The general rule is that for a witness to be qualified he must speak
from personal observation of the event or thing to be testified to. 2 A
person who proposes to testify to the contents of a document either
by copy or otherwise, must have read it.8"
The contention that a competent witness to the provisions of a lost
will must have witnessed its execution finds support in In re Needham's
Estate."' The court there rejected the following offer of proof: that
the witness would testify that the decedent showed him a paper and
stated that it was his will; that the witness examined the paper and
became familiar with its contents; that it purported upon its face to
be a will of the deceased, duly executed by him; and that the witness
was able to state its contents and provisions from the knowledge thus
obtained. Apparently because of a misapprehension of the facts, the
court declared that "the offered testimony of the witness Adams would
not have amounted to the testimony of one witness such as the statute
contemplates, for it was based entirely upon what he was told by the
deceased. He knew nothing either of the execution or contents of the
will save as told to him by the decedent.""8 In subsequent cases, how-
ever, the court has regarded the Needham case as standing for the
proposition that the two witnesses required by the statute must each
be able to testify to the provisions of the will from his or her own
knowledge, and not from the declarations of another, even of the
testator.8 1
In the Peters' case, the court declared that while the result in the
Needham case was correct since the opinion indicates that the execution
of the will was not adequately proven, it was not controlling. The
execution of the will in the Peters' case had been proved in prior pro-
bate proceedings and was not challenged in this action. The two cases
31 143 Wash. Dec. 777, 264 P.2d 1109 (1953).
822 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 657 (3d ed. 1940).
83 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1278 (3d ed. 1940).
84 70 Wash. 229, 126 Pac. 429 (1912).
85 Id. at 232-3, 126 Pac. at 430.
88 See In re Auritt's Estate, 175 Wash. 303, 27 P2d 713 (1933); In re Calvin's
Estate, 188 Wash. 283, 62 P.2d 461 (1936).
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indicate that the execution of the will must be satisfactorily proved
before the offer of proof of its provisions will be accepted.
GusT A. LEDAxiS
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Destruction of Common Law Remedies-Wife's Loss of Con-
sortium. Plaintiff's husband was injured through the negligence of his
employer; he recovered compensation under the state Workmen's
Compensation Act.' Plaintiff brought an action to recover damages
for her loss of consortium. In Ask v. S. S. Mullen, Inc.' the Court
rejected the claim, holding workmen's compensation was an exclusive
remedy since the Act provides ". . . relief for workmen, injured in
extrahazardous work, and their families and dependents'. . . and to
that end all civil actions ... for... personal injuries ... are... abol-
ished, except as in this title provided."' The wife is included in the
term "family" by previous Washington decisions.' A possibly more
emphatic basis of the decision is the provision that compensation
.... shall be in lieu of any and all rights of action whatsoever against
any person whomsoever. . . ."' The Act does provide compensation
for the wife as follows: She receives compensation in event of her
husband's death, and in case of partial or total disability the injured
workman receives greater benefits if he is married than if single.'
Since the case was of first impression the Court turned to many
other jurisdictions to support its conclusions.7 Plaintiff relied heavily
upon Hitaffer v. Argonne Co.,' which permitted the wife to recover
for loss of consortium even though the applicable federal statute pro-
vides that the employer's liability under the act is to be "... exclusive
and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee,
his legal representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of
kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from such
1 RCW 51.
2 143 Wash. Dec. 319, 261 P.2d 118 (1953), noted 26 Rocxy MT. L. REv. 216 (1954).
8 RCW 51.04.010 (Italics added).
4 E.g., Collins v. Northwest Casualty Co., 180 Wash. 347, 39 P.2d 986 (1935).
5 RCW 51.32.010, a provision ignored in note, 26 RocKY MT. L. REv. 216 (1954)
which disapproves of the principle case.
a RCW 51.32.040 et seq.
7E.g., Napier v. Martin, 194 Term. 105, 250 S.W2d 35 (1952); Holder v. Elms
Hotel Co., 338 Mo. 857, 92 S.W.2d. 620 (1936) ; likewise, the husband cannot sue for
his loss of consortium, Swan v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 129 Misc. 500, 222 N. Y. Supp.
111 (1927) ; GuGse v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 260 Wis. 403, 51 N.W.2d 24 (1952).
887 U.S. App. D.C. 57, 183 F2d 811; cert. den. 340 U.S. 852 (1950); noted 36
CORN. L. Q. 148 (1950).
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